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A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO TEACHING WORK LAW 
MARION CRAIN* AND PAULINE T. KIM** 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay discusses the holistic philosophy that guides us in thinking 
about and teaching Work Law.1 As Michael Fischl has explained, most law 
school curricula divide the law of the workplace into three discrete topics: 
labor law, employment discrimination, and employment law—the “holy 
trinity” of American work law.2 Labor Law traditionally encompasses the 
study of collective rights at work, particularly the law governing union 
organizing and collective bargaining.3 Employment Discrimination deals with 
the statutes and case law that advance the antidiscrimination norm in the 
workplace through prohibitions on status discrimination at work.4 Employment 
Law covers the statutes and common law governing individual rights at work, 
ranging from minimum standards legislation to judicially created doctrines 
based in tort and contract law.5 
 
* Marion Crain is Vice Provost at Washington University in St. Louis, the Wiley B. Rutledge 
Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Work & Social 
Capital at Washington University School of Law in St. Louis. 
** Pauline T. Kim is the Charles Nagel Professor of Law at Washington University School of 
Law in St. Louis. We are grateful to Matthew Hoffman and Laura Raden for research assistance, 
and to the Wefel Center for Employment Law at St. Louis University School of Law for 
organizing this Symposium. 
 1. This philosophy is further elaborated in a textbook we co-authored with our colleague, 
Michael Selmi. See MARION G. CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORK LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS ix–x (2d ed. 2010). 
 2. Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 
BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 165, 169–170 (2007). 
 3. Labor Law courses typically focus on the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
151–169 (2011). 
 4. Employment Discrimination courses are organized around the core antidiscrimination 
statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006), but also 
usually include coverage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (2006), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (West 2000 & 
Supp. 2008), and sometimes the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2654 (2006). 
 5. Employment Law courses tend to be survey courses, with coverage including the 
common law of wrongful discharge; contract law pertaining to the employment relation, 
including employee handbooks, covenants not to compete, and the law governing pre-dispute 
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It has become increasingly clear, however, that regulation of the 
employment relation defies such categorical thinking. Single actions by an 
employer can easily yield multiple claims by workers that cross traditional 
legal categories.6 The traditional division also misses important opportunities 
to appreciate how the historical and social context shapes the form that labor 
market intervention takes. A holistic approach offers the opportunity to forge a 
comprehensive and coherent understanding of work law that will better prepare 
students for the realities of practice, where factual issues know no doctrinal 
boundaries. 
Accordingly, we view regulation of the employment relation through a 
broad lens, organizing study in a basic introductory survey course around core 
themes of conflict that characterize the employment relation. We include job 
security, employee mobility, dignitary interests, voice, equality and non-
discrimination, wages and hours, health and pension benefits, workplace 
safety, and public and private systems of justice. In each area, we ask students 
to consider how law should mediate the conflicts, what difference it makes 
whether employee rights are conceptualized collectively or individually, what 
influence the increasing racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of the workforce 
should have on law and workplace policy, whether dispute resolution systems 
should be privatized or remain in the public fora, and whether law is better 
suited than human resource practices, employer initiatives, or employee self-
help measures to accomplish the desired goals.7 
In this Essay, we offer two examples of how such holistic coverage might 
impact teaching and shape pedagogical goals.8 The first example illustrates 
how legal problem-solving involving a concrete issue necessarily crosses 
doctrinal boundaries. More specifically, we consider the challenges 
surrounding the use of social media by employees, and the efforts of employers 
 
arbitration agreements; tort claims for infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy; 
statutory coverage of wage and hour laws, workplace safety, the provision of health care and 
pension benefits, and family leave; and other topics of interest to the professor that can be 
shoehorned into an already crowded semester. 
 6. Nicole Porter makes a similar point in her contribution to this Symposium. See Nicole 
Buonocore Porter, A Proposal to Improve the Workplace Law Curriculum from a Corporate 
Compliance Perspective, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 155 (2013). While she emphasizes teaching 
workplace law from a corporate compliance perspective, our focus is on how to transcend these 
doctrinal categories and present work law holistically to students from their first encounters with 
the subject. This goal is particularly important given that a significant number of schools no 
longer offer a separate labor law course. As Porter reports, 46 out of 195 law schools do not 
currently offer labor law. See id. at 158. 
 7. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at x. 
 8. We focus on these two examples because they involve very recent developments in work 
law, demonstrating the growing importance of approaching work law holistically. For additional 
examples of workplace issues that cross doctrinal boundaries, see Porter, supra note 6, at 162–
169. 
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to regulate that use. The emerging tension over who controls employees’ 
communications over social media implicates not only concerns about 
individual speech and privacy rights, traditionally part of employment law, but 
also the interests of employees in workplaces free of discrimination as well as 
their interest in responding collectively to shared concerns about working 
conditions, issues falling with the domains of employment discrimination and 
labor law, respectively. Thus, when considering the interaction between social 
media and the work relationship, a full appreciation of the legal risks and 
strategies facing employers, employees and their representatives requires 
facility with concepts across doctrinal categories. A holistic approach to 
teaching employment law not only enables students to cross these boundaries, 
it also enriches student understanding by highlighting the tensions as well as 
commonalities between these seemingly disparate areas of the law. 
The second example involves a more general theme running throughout 
the law of work, the ability of employees to join together to leverage group 
power vis-à-vis their employer. Because most individual employees are 
relatively powerless against the consolidated power of the corporate employer, 
all three traditional work law subjects must address how, if at all, law should 
mediate that power imbalance. To what degree should law support the 
conceptualization of rights and facilitate the assertion of claims at a collective 
rather than individual level? In employment law, where the individual rights 
conception is most pronounced, the individual was historically left to rely on 
her own bargaining power. Congress soon found it necessary to establish 
minimum standards regarding matters such as wages, hours, and safety 
standards to prevent employers from exploiting individual vulnerability. In 
recent years, debate has centered around the availability of class claims under 
minimum standards legislation and in arbitration settings—are group claims 
essential to effectively enforce those rights? In employment discrimination, 
courts conceptualized discrimination as a harm that occurs to individuals 
because of their membership in a group, which may be sufficient to support 
class litigation in appropriate cases. The shifting nature of employment 
discrimination and evolving Supreme Court doctrine renders class 
discrimination claims increasingly difficult to maintain, however. In labor law, 
Congress responded to the imbalance of power by protecting unionization and 
mandating collective bargaining, explicitly permitting employees to band 
together to leverage their labor power. When we put the class and collective 
action claims from employment discrimination and employment law together 
with the labor law perspective, we can begin to see them all as a piece of the 
same conflict—a struggle over workers’ ability to leverage group power rather 
than being forced to confront the employer as individuals. 
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I.  INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE INTERESTS: THE CASE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
The explosive growth in popularity of social media platforms, like 
Facebook and Twitter, has transformed how people communicate with one 
another, and this transformation has inevitably affected workplace relations as 
well. Some firms, particularly those with a broad consumer base, have sought 
to harness the power of social media to promote their products and services 
and manage their public images. At the same time, widespread private use of 
social media by individuals has heightened firms’ interests in monitoring and 
controlling the communications of their employees. For their part, employees 
have an interest in unfettered use of these new platforms, as a means of 
communication, entertainment, affiliation, and self-definition. The difficulties 
in mediating this tension between employer and employee interests are 
exacerbated by the increasingly blurred boundary between work and private 
life.9 Employer-provided equipment is frequently used for personal as well as 
work-related communications, while employees are increasingly being 
encouraged to access work materials on their own personal devices, which are 
used for off-duty purposes as well.10 
If one were to examine the legal implications of the growing use of social 
media solely within the frame of employment discrimination law, one concern 
would likely predominate: how to prevent discriminatory harassment, 
particularly sexual harassment. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on 
certain protected characteristics, including sex,11 and the Supreme Court has 
made clear that harassing behavior constitutes discrimination when it is 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive” to create a hostile work environment.12 
While actionable harassment can occur along other protected dimensions, such 
 
 9. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV., 901, 901–02 (2012); Patricia Sánchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred 
Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 
64 (2012); Ariana R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act for the Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 
461, 467–68 (2012); Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between 
Personal Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 1 (2011); Robert 
Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its De-
Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 83–84 (2008). 
 10. See, e.g., Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 987, 999 (C.D. Cal. 
2012) (finding plaintiff had a limited expectation of privacy in personal mobile phone used to 
make business calls and paid for in part by employer); Yaron Dori & Jeff Kosseff, Employers 
Must Obtain Employee Consent For BYOD Programs, LAW360 (May 24, 2013, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/cfc92c70-1ddd-4ce0-9a88-25ec908324df/Presentation/Pub 
licationAttachment/f2476f96-c4d4-4dd3-b575-28614fc436f1/Employers_Must_Obtain_Employ 
ee_Consent_for_BYOD_Programs.pdf (reporting trend among companies to require workers to 
“bring their own devices” to access work email and other work-related applications). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 12. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
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as race or national origin, the overwhelming majority of harassment cases have 
involved charges of sexual harassment.13 The existence of a sexually hostile 
work environment may be established based on sexual advances or jokes by 
supervisors or co-workers, the use of degrading language, or the presence of 
pornography or highly sexualized images in the workplace. Many of the 
behaviors that could give rise to a hostile work environment—propositions, the 
sharing of pornography, highly sexualized or derogatory language and jokes—
can occur as easily via electronic communications as in face-to-face 
interactions, and so the growth of social media seems to expand the avenues by 
which discriminatory harassment might occur. And because co-workers may 
communicate with one another outside of work on social media platforms, 
questions arise regarding the employers’ responsibility for comments and 
behaviors occurring outside the workplace and off-duty.14 
Given the risks of legal liability for sexual harassment, the employment 
discrimination frame might suggest that employers should engage in extensive 
monitoring of their employees’ activities on all social media platforms, 
whether engaged in on- or off-duty, and discipline them for any activities that 
violate employer-imposed norms of propriety. This impulse to monitor is likely 
reinforced by case law establishing the contours of an employer’s vicarious 
liability for harassment. In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court held that 
an employer could avoid vicarious liability for a hostile work environment 
created by a supervisory employee if the employer “exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” and the 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of employer-provided 
opportunities to address the harassment.15 Although much of the subsequent 
case law focused on the adequacy of employers’ sexual harassment complaint 
procedures and the “reasonableness” of employee behavior, an open question 
remains as to what other steps an employer must take to prevent harassing 
behavior in order to take advantage of the affirmative defense. 
Consideration of employment discrimination law raises other concerns 
about the use of social media. An employee’s or applicant’s online activities 
can reveal a host of personal information, including information about 
protected characteristics that might not otherwise be apparent to the employer. 
 
 13. See CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at 637. 
 14. See, e.g., Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 543 (N.J. 2000) (holding 
employer would be liable for failing to remedy workplace harassment based on statements posted 
by co-employees on electronic bulletin board); Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Servs., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 
2d 77, 85–86 (D.P.R. 2010) (granting employer’s summary judgment on racial harassment claim 
that included allegation that a co-worker had posted an offensive racial comment on Facebook). 
See also Jeremy Gelms, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability Under Title VII for 
Employee Social Media Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249, 249–50, 269–72 (2012). 
 15. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
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For example, online posts by an individual, or her associates, might disclose 
her religion, the existence of a disability, or an intimate association with 
someone of another race, all prohibited bases for making employment 
decisions under anti-discrimination laws.16 Online postings may also reveal an 
individual’s family medical history, a form of genetic information. Under the 
recently enacted Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act,17 however, 
employers are prohibited not only from taking adverse actions based on an 
employee’s, or applicant’s, genetic traits, but also from requesting or collecting 
such information.18 Using the frame of employment discrimination law thus 
focuses attention on the particular traits protected by law and how social media 
might make employees more vulnerable to adverse actions based on those 
protected characteristics. 
Examined from the perspective of employment law, however, the tension 
over employee use of social media has a different cast. Employment law has 
long been concerned with individual rights of workers, including their interests 
in autonomy and in avoiding dignitary harms. Thus, when considering social 
media, concerns about employee privacy and speech come to the fore. 
Although in some ways just another mode of communication, social media—
and electronic communications more broadly—present distinct challenges. 
Unlike more traditional forms of communication, electronic communications 
can be easily monitored in real time or permanently stored for later retrieval 
and analysis. They can also be infinitely and exactly replicated and distributed 
to large numbers of people almost instantaneously. As individuals move more 
of their personal lives online, the details of their associations, activities, and 
beliefs are increasingly vulnerable to surveillance and subsequent disclosure, 
including by or to their employers 
The growing use of social media thus raises complex issues about when 
and under what circumstances employers may legitimately access employees’ 
personal accounts. Courts have struggled to define when an individual 
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy,19 and how statutory 
 
 16. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (religion); 
The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) (2006) (disability); Holcomb v. Iona 
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (association); Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, 
Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994–95 (6th Cir. 1999) (association); 
Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (association). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to -11 (2012). 
 18. Id. § 2000ff-1(b). The Act makes it unlawful for an employer to “request, require or 
purchase genetic information” subject to certain exceptions. 
 19. Compare Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1234, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996) 
(finding no expectation of privacy in pager messages), and Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 
97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding employee did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in 
messages sent over company owned e-mail system) with Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 
990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2010) (concluding employee had reasonable expectation of privacy in 
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limitations on electronic access created in an era predating Facebook or 
MySpace should apply to social media platforms.20 What is the legal 
significance, for example, of privacy settings established by the employee? Or 
the fact that the individual’s account is password protected? Does a “friend” 
request by a supervisor threaten an employee’s personal privacy? Legislatures 
have begun to step in, with nearly a dozen states passing statutes to protect 
employee privacy by prohibiting employers from requesting or requiring that 
employees or applicants turn over their passwords to their social media 
accounts.21 Pushing against greater protection of employee privacy are 
employers’ needs to safeguard trade secrets and other confidential business 
information. 
Social media platforms are not only vehicles for personal communications, 
but also fora for the individual to express her opinions and concerns to a 
broader public. Precisely because social media is such a powerful tool for 
broadcasting opinions, employees have an interest in using it to engage in 
unfettered speech—whether for purposes of self-expression or advocacy on 
public issues. And for precisely the same reason, employers may fear that an 
employee’s publicly-expressed opinions may cause reputational or other harm 
to the firm. Thus, the speech aspects of social media are another locus of 
tension in the employment relationship. Public employees have alleged that 
employer retaliation for their speech and associations on social media violate 
 
email exchanged with her attorney on her personal, password-protected email account accessed 
through a company-provided laptop computer), and Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness 
Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding former employee had reasonable 
expectation of privacy in personal, password-protected email accounts). The Supreme Court 
recently declined to decide the question of whether a public employee had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in personal text messages sent on an employer-provided pager in City of 
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010). 
 20. See Stored Communications Act, Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2006); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113–14 
(3d Cir. 2004); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002); Pietrylo v. 
Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06–5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *18–20. (D.N.J. July 25, 
2008). 
 21. To date, the following states have enacted such statutes: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 
11–2–124 (2013); California, CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b) (West 2013); Maryland, MD. CODE 
ANN., LABOR & EMPL. § 3–712 (West 2013); Illinois, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10 (2013); 
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.273 (2012) UTAH, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34–48–201 (2013); 
New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50–4–34 (2013); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 8–2–127 
(2013); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.0003 (2013); and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
34:6B-6 (2013). Similar legislation is pending in the U.S. Congress. See Michael O. Loatman, 
Congress May Limit Employer Access to Personal Social Media Accounts, 28 DAILY LAB. REP. 
(BNA), Feb. 11, 2013, at 23 (reporting that a proposed Social Networking Online Protection Act 
(SNOPA) was introduced in Congress). 
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their First Amendment rights.22 Employees in the private sector generally lack 
legal protection for their individual off-duty expression,23 and numerous 
instances of workers losing their jobs because of their online activities outside 
the workplace have been reported.24 Given the lack of legal regulation in this 
area, private firms are increasingly promulgating social media policies that 
attempt to establish standards for their employees’ social media use, even off-
duty, on pain of discipline or discharge, while scholars have argued for explicit 
legal protection for the speech rights of private sector workers.25 
Even though employees may lack robust legal protection under doctrines 
intended to protect individual speech and privacy, retaliation for certain forms 
of employee speech can give rise to employer liability. In particular, speech 
among employees relating to shared workplace concerns, such as wages, hours, 
or working conditions are protected as a form of collective activity. Thus, 
examining employees’ social media use from a labor law perspective 
highlights a new set of legal issues. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) broadly protects workers’ rights to self-organization, 
encompassing not only formal union organizing, but also all “concerted 
activity” undertaken for “mutual aid or protection.”26 Numerous National 
Labor Relations Board (Board) and court decisions have established that these 
 
 22. These claims have met with varying degrees of success. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, No. 
12–1671, 2013 WL 5228033, *15–16 (4th Cir. Sept. 18, 2013) (holding that ‘‘liking’’ the 
Facebook campaign page of a candidate for sheriff was constitutionally protected speech); 
Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283, at *4 (E.D. Ark., Nov. 1, 
2011) (holding that plaintiff’s Facebook post referring to the firing of several fellow employees in 
the Circuit Clerk’s office was constitutionally protected speech). But see Gresham v. City of 
Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2011 WL 4601020, at *2, *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2011) 
(finding police officer’s Facebook comments constitutionally protected, but concluding that 
government’s interest in efficiency outweighed plaintiff’s interest in speech and therefore no First 
Amendment violation occurred). 
 23. The First Amendment restricts government, not non-state actors, although it could 
provide a public policy basis for protecting private sector employees from retaliation for their 
speech. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir.1983). In addition, a 
handful of states have statutes that protect private employee speech, or related interests, such as 
political activity. See Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: 
Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L & POL. 295, 313–33 (2012). 
Employee speech might also be protected if it falls within a specific statutory or common law 
protection for whistleblower speech—that is, speech reporting or objecting to specified types of 
unlawful employer practices. See Kim, supra note 9, at 924. For the most part, however, private 
employees’ off-duty speech unrelated to the workplace is not legally protected. 
 24. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 9, at 912–13; Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are There 
Legal Protections for Employees Who Blog?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 355, 357–58 (2007). 
 25. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley & Ryan P. McGinley-Stempel, Beyond the Water Cooler: 
Speech and the Workplace in an Era of Social Media, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 79–80 
(2012). 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
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rights apply not only when workers belong to a union or are attempting to form 
a union, but to unorganized workers as well, even though they may not have 
any conscious intent to organize at the time.27 These precedents have 
recognized that in order to meaningfully protect the right to organize, informal 
joint discussions among employees—the precursors to group action—must 
also be protected.28 Even individual activity may be protected as concerted 
where “individual employees seek to initiate, to induce, or to prepare for group 
action, as well as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the 
attention of management.”29 
In a series of recent decisions, the Board has made clear that these section 
7 protections can apply to workers’ discussions on social media.30 For 
example, the Board found that several employees were engaged in protected 
concerted activity when they complained about their supervisor in a 
conversation on Facebook. The Facebook discussion had followed a meeting in 
which the workers raised concerns about their safety when closing the 
employer’s store after most of the businesses in the area had already closed. 
The administrative law judge viewed their Facebook posts as a continuation of 
that group effort to address their concerns, but the Board concluded “the 
Facebook postings would have constituted protected concerted activity in and 
of themselves” because they related to their terms and conditions of 
employment.31 Thus, the employer’s decision to discharge the employees 
because of their Facebook posts constituted a violation of section 8(a)(1).32 
The Board has also scrutinized employers’ social media policies for 
compliance with the NLRA. Prior Board authority established that a work rule 
 
 27. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962); NLRB v. Phx. Mutual 
Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948); NLRB v. 
Guernsey-Muskigum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960); Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 
323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247–48 (1977). 
 28. Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General 
Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1701 (1989). 
 29. Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). 
 30. See, e.g., Design Tech. Grp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 
15,687 (Apr. 19, 2013); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. 
(CCH) ¶ 15,620 (Sept. 28, 2012); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–
2013 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,656 (Dec. 14, 2012). The status of these decisions is uncertain after 
the D.C. Circuit held in Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 506–07 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013), that since January 2012 three of the Board’s members have 
lacked constitutionally valid appointments, leaving the Board without a quorum to take lawful 
action. See, e.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2642 (2010). Nevertheless, 
the issue is likely to recur, as the Board has received numerous charges alleging interference with 
protected rights based on employer’s retaliation for employees’ use of social media and many 
similar cases are pending. 
 31. Design Tech. Grp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 96. 
 32. Id. 
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violated section 8(a)(1) when the rule “would reasonably tend to chill 
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.”33 Even if the rule does not 
explicitly prohibit section 7 activities, it is unlawful if “employees would 
reasonably construe the language to prohibit section 7 activity.”34 The Board 
has recently found that an employee handbook that broadly prohibits any 
online statements “that damage the Company, defame any individual or 
damage any person’s reputation clearly encompass[ed] concerted 
communications protesting . . . treatment of [] employees” and therefore 
violated 8(a)(1).35 In another case, the Board found that an employer’s Social 
Media Policy unlawfully restricted employees’ section 7 rights where it 
prohibited employees from making “disparaging or defamatory comments” 
about the employer or making negative comments online during “Company 
time.”36 
Viewed through a labor law lens, social media use by employees raises 
both the possibility and the attendant risks of collective activity. The labor laws 
were intended to redress the imbalance of power between the employer and 
individual employees by permitting workers to join together and bargain as a 
group. One of the challenges for workers seeking to organize a union is how to 
reach and engage with others who might share similar concerns about 
workplace conditions. The traditional deference accorded the employer to 
control its property and the production process has made organizational efforts 
at the workplace difficult,37 while reaching a dispersed group of workers after 
hours also poses challenges. Social networking sites, listserves and the like 
open a new avenue for reaching and engaging co-workers—the sort of 
precursors to group action protected under section 7. And yet, the ubiquity and 
informality of communications on social media often make it difficult to 
characterize the nature of these interactions. Are online complaints about work 
by an employee an initial step toward group action? Or merely unprotected 
griping by the individual?38 And how far can an employer go in promulgating 
 
 33. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 825 (1998). 
 34. Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 647 (2004). In addition, a rule may be 
unlawful without explicitly prohibiting section 7 activities if “the rule was promulgated in 
response to union activity; or . . . the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 
rights.” Id. 
 35. Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 
15,602 (Sept. 7, 2012). 
 36. Dish Network Corp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,695 
(Apr. 30, 2013). 
 37. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 532–33 (1992). 
 38. See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–2013 NLRB 
Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,656 (Dec. 14, 2012) (Hayes, J., dissenting) (arguing that Facebook postings 
were “mere griping” not protected concerted activity). 
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policies to protect its reputation and proprietary information before they would 
“tend to chill employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights?”39 
Our purpose here is not to resolve, or even to catalog in a comprehensive 
way, the many legal issues arising from the intersection of social media use 
and the workplace. Rather, the point is to provide a concrete illustration of the 
limitations of the traditional tripartite division of work law into the study of 
employment discrimination, employment law, and labor law. Using any of 
these frames alone presents a distorted and highly incomplete picture of the 
issues raised by employees’ use of social media. Simply put, those challenges 
cannot be understood without taking a holistic perspective on the issue, one 
that brings to bear insights from all three doctrinal areas. Similarly, the 
communicative potential of social media offers possibilities and risks across 
traditional boundaries. Individual employees may use social media to engage 
in whistleblowing; unions may use it as a channel for organizing workers; and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers may use it to reach potential members in a collective action. 
In short, students who cannot recognize how an issue like the use and 
regulation of social media in the workplace raises issues across doctrinal 
boundaries are not prepared to practice law. We believe that a holistic 
approach to teaching law—one that constantly keeps in view the competing 
frames through which we might approach conflicting interests in the 
workplace—is necessary to teach students when and how to transcend 
doctrinal boundaries. 
II.  INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE ACTION: LEVERAGING GROUP POWER 
As the preceding materials on social media illustrate, individual 
vulnerability to employer power circumscribes the ability to exercise voice in 
the workplace. The limited bargaining power that individual employees 
possess also renders substantive rights assertion and enforcement challenging. 
Workers have historically sought to leverage power by banding together—
whether as plaintiffs in class or collective actions, through more informal 
workplace networks, or in formal organizations like unions. Employers have 
resisted these efforts vigorously, characterizing the employment relation as 
primarily a matter of individual contract and highlighting the role of individual 
agency. By tracing the ebb and flow of such efforts and the law’s response to 
them, we use the theme of the struggle to leverage group power to demonstrate 
the relationships between what at first blush might seem to be disparate areas 
of work law. 
In a holistic Work Law course, we begin by covering labor law principles 
at a relatively superficial level to provide the theoretical backdrop for this 
theme. The struggle for power in labor law is patent. The law explicitly 
 
 39. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 825 (1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
18 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:7 
protects workers’ rights to make common cause by forming a union as a device 
to leverage, and thus equalize, bargaining power.40 We then segue to the rise of 
the individual rights regime, pointing out how labor unions advanced workers’ 
power by lobbying for legislation protecting individual employment rights, 
including most of the statutes that are more typically covered in Employment 
Law and Employment Discrimination.41 These statutes serve to raise the floor 
from which unions bargain for their members,42 but they also advance the 
interests of workers as a class. However, the rights themselves—unlike those 
created by the NLRA—are conceptualized as fundamentally individual in 
nature.43 And therein lies the dilemma: given the small amounts at stake for 
low wage workers, how many individual employees will be able to persuade a 
private attorney to take the case, and how many will possess the financial and 
psychological/emotional resources to persevere when the employer mounts 
sustained resistance? Although unions sometimes are able to use class actions 
under these statutes as catalysts to “galvanize nascent forms of collective 
organization,”44 workers more often rely upon the efforts of union substitutes 
to leverage group power, including plaintiffs’ class action lawyers, nonprofit 
workers’ centers, and administrative agencies.45 We ask whether these entities 
 
 40. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). The Court upheld the statute 
against constitutional challenge in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., explaining: 
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they were organized 
out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with 
an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of 
himself and family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, 
he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; 
that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their 
employer. 
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). 
 41. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at 31. 
 42. Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 
169, 174–87, 192 (1991). 
 43. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review 
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 395 (2002). 
 44. Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2689 
(2008). Such efforts are complicated by the labor law doctrine that unions impermissibly 
influence election results (i.e. engage in vote-buying) when they provide prospective bargaining 
unit members with free legal services in a class action wage or civil rights action filed during an 
organizing drive prior to a union election. See, e.g., Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 
579 (6th Cir. 1995); Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Detroit 
Auto Auction, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 97–6487, 98–5096, 1999 WL 435160, at *2 (6th Cir. July 17, 
1999). 
 45. See Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States: 
Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385 (2006) (discussing efforts of alternative worker 
organizations that function more like social justice movements than like traditional unions). 
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are likely to be as effective as unions in this endeavor,46 or whether other 
agendas may threaten to overwhelm their efforts. In particular, do class actions 
engage workers as active agents in resisting their own exploitation and produce 
the sorts of lasting and forward-looking changes that unionization and 
collective bargaining offer, or are they simply vehicles for financial recoveries 
for lawyers? 47 
In the litigation context, aggregation of claims offers significant 
advantages over individual rights enforcement for addressing workplace power 
differentials. Class claims help to equalize resources between the disputants, 
respond to the asymmetries of market information for workers and employers, 
and facilitate deterrence and forward-looking resolution of claims as well as 
compensation for past rights violations.48 Congress, government agencies, and 
the courts have at some points in history actively supported aggregation of 
claims, but in recent years the courts have demonstrated increasing hostility 
toward collective action.49 Most employment law and employment 
discrimination professors cover the shifting approach to class and collective 
claims as matters of evolving procedural law, rather than as a struggle to 
leverage collective worker power. By approaching the cases in the traditional 
 
 46. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension 
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 575, 593, 624, 637–38 (1992) (explaining unique role played by unions and 
collective bargaining in workplace governance and arguing that the collective bargaining system 
is superior to individual employment protections because it enhances voice, improves 
productivity, allows for flexibility and fosters efficiency, enhances enforcement, and offers more 
stability). 
 47. See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action 
Employment Discrimination and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2003) (arguing that 
class litigation is focused on remedying past discrimination rather than altering the workplace 
structure to prevent future discrimination, and observing that incentive structures for attorneys 
and diversity task forces are poorly aligned with the goal of furthering forward-looking change). 
 48. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 146 (2011). 
 49. Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules to 
Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 728, 759–60 (2010). 
Legislative and judicial hostility toward group action in the litigation context is not limited to the 
labor and employment law field. See Resnik, supra note 48, at 145–46 (explaining how resistance 
to class action opportunities has spanned the economic spectrum, from litigation efforts by Legal 
Services on behalf of the poor to securities litigation); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, 
Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal 
Civil Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 318 (2013) (examining recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on federal civil procedure and concluding that it is “decidedly pro-business,” in part 
because it makes aggregation of individual claims in public fora very difficult, reducing the 
plaintiffs’ choice to one “between collective access to the judicial system or no access at all”); 
Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, (May 4, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-supreme-
court.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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way, however, we miss opportunities to show students how these cases connect 
to the larger theme of the struggle to leverage power, why they are so hard-
fought, and the difference that the outcome makes on the ground. 
A series of seemingly disparate cases from employment discrimination and 
employment law contexts illustrate the pendulum swings of the law as 
employers seek to deal with employees individually, workers resist by 
attempting collective action, and law responds, leading in turn to strategic 
responses from employers and new tactics by workers struggling to leverage 
group power. For example, in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, the Supreme Court 
vacated certification of a nationwide class of women workers at Wal-Mart who 
alleged that a corporate policy of discretion to local mangers and corporate 
officers combined with a culture replete with sex stereotyping resulted in 
discriminatory pay and promotion decisions.50 The Court found that the 
proposed class did not satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.51 After the Court found the class action 
inappropriate in the absence of a specific discriminatory company policy, 
many lower courts have applied Dukes to block class action discrimination 
suits where the plaintiffs rely on aggregate statistics, expert testimony, and 
discretionary managerial decision making to prove discrimination.52 Thus, the 
 
 50. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548, 2556–57 (2011). 
 51. Id. at 2550–57. 
 52. See, e.g., Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 486–489 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying Dukes 
and denying certification of proposed nationwide sex discrimination class action by female 
applicants rejected for positions as sales representatives; plaintiffs used statistical evidence and 
expert testimony to support allegations of a white male-dominated business culture that was 
replicated through subjective hiring decisions); Stockwell v. City of San Francisco, No. C 08–
5180 PJH, 2011 WL 4803505, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011) (denying class certification where 
employees alleged only aggregate statistical evidence of disproportionate impact); Bell v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08–6292 (RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 6256978, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 
2011) (denying certification where managerial discretionary decisionmaking would have to be 
examined in the individual context of each employee’s circumstances). Nevertheless, the Dukes 
bar has not proved to be completely insurmountable. Where plaintiffs are able to identify a 
specific discriminatory policy and the class size is significantly smaller than the Dukes class, 
some courts have allowed certification. See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 
492, 509, 545 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying class action where plaintiffs were able to identify a 
discriminatory policy at the top ranks of management, and distinguishing Dukes because 
plaintiffs there challenged a lack of policy that allowed discrimination to flourish at lower levels); 
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488–91 (7th Cir. 
2012) (certifying class action race discrimination case where class size of 700 was sufficiently 
limited to avoid placing undue pressure on the employer to settle, and distinguishing Dukes based 
on class size of 1.4 million which might coerce the defendant into settling simply to avoid the risk 
of financial destruction); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117–19 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class certification where plaintiffs alleged companywide policies). See 
also Linda S. Mullenix, A Year After ‘Wal-Mart,’ Class Actions Not Dead Yet, NAT’L L.J., June 
11, 2012, at 10 (reviewing federal district court decisions that distinguished Dukes and permitted 
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possibility for success on such claims has been significantly diminished. 
Because Rule 23 does not apply to the EEOC, one might posit that its systemic 
litigation program could be the mainstay of employment discrimination class 
actions under Title VII in situations where a specific discriminatory policy is 
not readily identifiable.53 But the EEOC and equivalent state agencies are 
increasingly overwhelmed with claims,54 leaving private lawyers as the 
primary watchdogs for civil rights enforcement. 
Similar enforcement challenges plague wage and hour law. The provisions 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) can be enforced through civil actions 
brought either by the Secretary of Labor or by the aggrieved workers 
themselves.55 Wage and hour violations are widespread, and the Wage and 
Hour Division of the Department of Labor is overwhelmed.56 Individual 
workers struggle to find a lawyer willing to take their cases, since the typical 
recovery under the FLSA for any individual worker is low. Until recently, 
 
class certification where plaintiffs were able to identify a specific common policy and practice, 
and arguing that forecasts of the demise of class litigation may be premature). 
 53. By the end of 2012, twenty percent of the EEOC’s litigation docket consisted of 
systemic cases. Lydell C. Bridgeford, EEOC’s Systemic Program Set to Fill Gap in Private Class 
Actions, Attorneys Predict, 244 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) (Dec. 19, 2012), at A-5, A-6; see EEOC 
Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2012, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/en 
forcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Aug. 24, 2013). 
 54. In the last three years, the EEOC has processed close to 100,000 claims of workplace 
discrimination per year. See Charge Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2012, EEOC, http://www1.ee 
oc.gov//eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 24, 2013); see also Michael 
Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 56–58 (1996) (arguing that volume of claims and lengthy and 
cumbersome administrative process might justify abolishing the agency and allowing plaintiffs to 
proceed directly to court). 
 55. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 204(f) (2006). 
 56. See Lawrence E. Dubé, Labor Solicitor Sees Low-Wage Epidemic and Urges Employers 
to Take ‘High Road’, 109 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) June 6, 2013, at AA-1 (describing mismatch 
between staffing at Department of Labor and high rate of noncompliance with wage and hour 
laws, and discussing enforcement difficulties); Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, 
Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, 
NELP.ORG, 2, 5, http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (reporting on results of survey of low wage workers in four cities 
finding that two-thirds of the workers had suffered some form of wage violation during the 
preceding week, with the average worker losing fifteen percent of her earnings as a result). 
Further, a forensic audit performed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2008–09 
concluded that the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division was quite ineffective in its 
enforcement mechanisms, offering a confusing and discouraging complaint intake process, failing 
to record complaints, failing to investigate, failing to use all available enforcement tools, and 
characterized by lengthy delays. GAO’s Undercover Investigation: Wage Theft of America’s 
Vulnerable Workers Hearing Before the H. Comm.on Educ. & Labor, 111th Cong. 36–37 (2009) 
(statement of Greg Kutz, Managing Director, U.S. Government Accountability Office); Steven 
Greenhouse, Labor Agency is Failing Workers, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at A16. 
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however, collective action claims under the FLSA have been quite attractive to 
the plaintiffs’ bar. Unlike class actions, collective actions under the FLSA are 
opt-in claims, and they require plaintiffs only to be “similarly situated,” a 
standard that has historically been easier to satisfy than Rule 23’s commonality 
requirement.57 In 2013, the Supreme Court threw a monkey wrench into the 
mix, however, when it ruled that employers may “pick off” the lead plaintiff in 
an FLSA collective action by offering her all the relief she has requested so 
that her personal interest in the litigation is eliminated; if no other employees 
have joined the action at that point, the lead plaintiff cannot seek relief for 
similarly situated workers, and the case must be dismissed.58 
Workers’ ability to leverage power through collective action wage and 
hour claims is further hindered by the spillover of the Dukes rationale. 
Although some courts have held that the Dukes enhanced commonality 
requirements are completely inapplicable to wage and hour claims under the 
FLSA,59 others have extended the Dukes reasoning to the FLSA context.60 
Additionally, in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, a consumer-initiated class action 
antitrust claim by current and former Comcast subscribers in the Philadelphia 
area, the Court erected another hurdle to class claims, requiring that plaintiffs 
establish at the class certification stage that individual injury will be capable of 
 
 57. See David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective Actions under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 129, 130–31 (2003) (describing 
differences between the two types of actions); Daniel C. Lopez, Note, Collective Confusion: 
FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
275, 278, 309 (2009) (discussing hybrid actions combining state law wage and hour claims and 
FLSA collective action claims and arguing that joinder is confusing and that the two theories are 
in fundamental tension with one another; the author proposes repealing the collective action 
vehicle under the FLSA). 
 58. Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527–32 (2013). 
 59. See, e.g., Essame v. SSC Laurel Operating Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 821, 828 (D. Md. 2012) 
(stating that Rule 23 standards are “generally inapplicable” to FLSA collective actions and 
certifying plaintiff class in overtime pay case); Creely v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., Nos. 3:09 CV 
2879, 3:10 CV 417, 3:10 CV 2200, 2011 WL 3794142, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio July 1, 2011) 
(refusing to apply Dukes to FLSA collective action for overtime pay, and granting conditional 
certification at the earliest phase of the action; final certification was ultimately denied, but the 
court did not cite Dukes), final certification denied, 920 F. Supp. 2d 846. 
 60. See, e.g., Ealy v. Pinkerton Gov’t Servs., Inc., 514 F. App’x. 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(applying Dukes to an FLSA claim); MacGregor v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. 2:10–CV–03088, 
2011 WL 2981466, at *4 (D.S.C. July 22, 2011) (finding Dukes treatment of Rule 23’s 
commonality requirement “illuminating” at the conditional certification stage in an FLSA 
collective action suit); Wang v. Chinese Daily News, 709 F.3d 829, 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(vacating original opinion certifying California state law wage and hour claims as a class action 
and FLSA claims as a collective action following remand by Supreme Court, and instruction to 
reconsider the decision in light of Dukes); see also Forrand v. Fed. Express Corp., No. CV 08–
1360 DSF (PJWx), 2013 WL 1793951, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013) (refusing to certify 
class under California wage and hour law, citing Dukes). 
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proof at trial through evidence common to the class, and that damages are 
measurable on a class-wide basis.61 The Comcast analysis, too, was soon 
applied to wage and hour claims.62 A recent high-profile case involving a class 
of former interns at Hearst Corporation who argued that they had been 
misclassified as interns rather than employees and thus were owed back wages 
suffered a defeat at the class certification stage; the district court judge cited 
both Dukes and Comcast in support of his decision.63 
In still another line of cases, workers bound by predispute arbitration 
agreements signed as a condition of obtaining employment have attempted to 
leverage group power by bringing class claims before arbitrators. The typical 
predispute arbitration agreement waives the right to proceed on statutory or 
common law claims arising out of employment in court or administrative fora 
in exchange for a private dispute resolution process. In cases involving such 
waivers, the question has arisen whether a waiver of the right to bring class 
claims in both public fora and in arbitration is enforceable. In AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court ruled in a consumer context that such a 
waiver was enforceable, relying on the pro-arbitration policy of the Federal 
Arbitration Act.64 In 2013, the Court went further still in an antitrust context, 
ruling that a class action waiver is enforceable even where the cost of proving 
an individual claim exceeds the potential recovery, preventing (as the plaintiffs 
argued) the effective vindication of federal statutory rights.65 Relying heavily 
on Concepcion, the majority held that the policy favoring arbitration requires 
that arbitration agreements be strictly enforced; the effective vindication 
exception established in the Court’s earlier cases does not apply simply 
because a claim is expensive to prove.66 In a powerful dissent, Justice Kagan 
argued that the Court’s decision allows the more powerful party to a contract to 
use its power to coerce agreement to contract terms that essentially eliminate 
its liability, while the statutory rights remain superficially intact.67 
 
 61. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1430, 1435 (2013). 
 62. See Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., No. 3:10–CV–0591 (TJM/DEP), 2013 WL 1316452, at 
*3 (Mar. 29, 2013) (lower court applied Comcast to deny certification to class of Applebee’s 
employees suing under state law for unpaid wages because monetary relief would have to be 
calculated individually for each member of the class), appeal filed, available at http://www.citi 
zen.org/documents/Roach-v-Cannon-Corp-Petition-Appeal-Class-Certification.pdf (2d Cir. April 
12, 2013). But see Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513–16 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding 
that district court abused its discretion in denying class certification in wage and hour claim under 
California law and distinguishing Comcast because data for calculating damages could be readily 
culled from the company’s electronic payroll and timekeeping database). 
 63. Wang v. Hearst Corp., No. 12 CV 793(HB), 2013 WL 1903787, at *6–10 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 8, 2013). 
 64. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
 65. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2307–12 (2013). 
 66. Id. at 2309–10. 
 67. Id. at 2313–16 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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But suppose that the ban on class claims offends the policy explicitly 
advanced by another federal statute, such as the NLRA? In D.R. Horton, Inc., 
the NLRB ruled that a class action waiver in an employment arbitration 
agreement interfered with employees’ NLRA section 7 rights to engage in 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
or protection.68 The Board reasoned that collective pursuit of a workplace 
grievance in arbitration is part of the concerted legal action historically 
protected under the NLRA. Although employers may require employees to 
pursue arbitral proceedings on an individual basis, they may not compel 
employees to waive their rights to collectively pursue litigation of 
employment-related claims in all forums. The case is currently on appeal to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,69 but so far, most courts have 
rejected the Board’s reasoning, believing it inconsistent with the Court’s ruling 
in Concepcion and the Federal Arbitration Act.70 
It is perhaps easiest to appreciate the role of leveraging power in a Labor 
Law course. Nearly the entire semester in a traditional Labor Law course is 
spent examining the evolution of unionism as a tool to enhance worker power, 
and the law’s efforts first to repress it,71 then to support it,72 and ultimately to 
 
 68. D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15546 (Jan. 3, 
2012) appeal docketed, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. argued May 31, 2012). 
 69. Id. For an excellent and prescient analysis of the issues involved in harmonizing 
mandatory arbitration agreements with NLRA rights, see Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory 
Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 217–18 (2003). 
 70. See, e.g., Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 11–17530, 2013 WL 4437601 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 21, 2013) (asserting that D.R. Horton cannot be reconciled with Concepcion); Sutherland v. 
Ernst & Young, LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining to follow D.R. Horton); Owen v. 
Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that the court is not required to 
defer to the NLRB’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and “that arbitration agreements 
containing class waivers are enforceable in claims brought under the FLSA”); Delock v. Securitas 
Sec. Servs. USA, 883 F. Supp. 2d 784, 787 (E.D. Ark.2012) (holding that the NLRB has no 
special experience with the FAA and its decisions interpreting the FAA are not necessarily 
entitled to deference). 
 71. Labor activism was initially treated as an act of criminal conspiracy, and workers were 
tried and convicted for forming combinations “injurious to the public good.” Workers’ demands 
for higher wages were cast as efforts to “artificially” raise the prices of items that they produced, 
harming consumers and the community; criminal penalties were thus appropriate. See Transcript 
of Record, Commonwealth v. Pulis (Philadelphia Cordwainers Case), Mayor’s Ct. Phila. (1806), 
reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 62–69, 228–33 
(John R. Commons et al. eds., 3d ed. 1910). Combinations of workers were also seen as 
potentially dangerous, likely to resort to violence, and disruptive to commerce (and ultimately, 
threatening to the market structure). See Morris D. Forkosch, The Doctrine of Criminal 
Conspiracy and its Modern Application to Labor, 40 TEX. L. REV. 303, 318–20 (1962) 
(discussing how the English common law viewed combinations of workers to raise wages and 
reduce hours as an unlawful conspiracy, and how this view was accepted in the earliest days of 
the American republic). Early courts also routinely issued injunctions against strikes and 
picketing, a remedy that because of its timeliness was even more effective than criminal 
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adopt a private ordering regime featuring contract and dispute resolution 
mechanisms designed to channel worker protest toward therapeutic outlets for 
discussion and (hopefully) compromise.73 Even professors who strive to retain 
a posture of ideological neutrality will find themselves embroiled in class 
discussions of cases that turn on the question of the balance of power and the 
interplay between law, self-help by employers, and group action by workers.74 
Employer resistance to traditional union organizing is manifest in well-
financed anti-union campaigns, and many employer-side lawyers are essential 
participants in this effort.75 Cases involving employer bargaining obligations 
routinely chastise the National Labor Relations Board for placing its thumb on 
one side of the scale, admonish the Board that it should not pass on the 
 
prosecution in suppressing labor unionism. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1078 (Mass. 
1896). See William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1109, 1179 (1989) (discussing judicial repression of the “semi-outlawry” of collective 
action by labor unions); JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR 
LAW 7–8 (1983) (discussing law’s hostility and concern with the risk of “anarchy” stemming 
from collective action). 
 72. See Wagner Act of 1935 § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (stating that it was the policy of the 
United States to encourage the practice of collective bargaining and full freedom of worker self-
organization). Covered employees were afforded the right to organize and employers were 
required to bargain collectively with them through representatives of their choosing. The right 
was made effective through the proscription of employer unfair labor practices. 
 73. See General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B 192, 194 (1964) (explaining that good faith 
bargaining entails “the serious intent to adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common 
ground”) (quoting 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 85 (1936). Some have been more critical of the functions 
of collective bargaining as defined by American courts. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial 
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 
62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 267 (1978). One of my early students suggested that collective bargaining 
was effectively merely “an opium for the people.” KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL’S 
‘PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT’ 131 (Joseph O’Malley ed., Annette Jolin & Joseph O’Malley trans., 
1970). 
 74. See ATLESON, supra note 71, at 7–8 (arguing that labor law is coherent only when 
consideration is afforded to hidden values and assumptions manifested by legal doctrine); Klare, 
supra note 73, at 318–336 (explaining how differing ideologies have pervaded the judicial 
process in labor law); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the 
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (1996) (explaining how law has undermined the 
legitimacy of group action); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-
War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
1, 1 (1999) (explaining how individual rights have supplanted group rights in American work 
law). 
 75. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition 
to Organizing, ECON. POL’Y INST., 1–2 (May 20, 2009), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp235/ 
(analyzing employer anti-union strategies in NLRB-supervised elections between 1999 and 2003 
and finding extensive use of threats to close the plant, discharges of pro-union workers, and 
threats to cut wages and benefits); John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the “Union Free” 
Movement in the USA since the 1970s, 33 INDUS. REL. J. 197, 198 (2002) (describing employers’ 
rising use of anti-union consultants and the tactics that they recommend). 
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substantive terms of labor contracts, and often contain sharp-tongued 
dissents.76 Cases involving the use of economic weapons in labor disputes, 
whether employees’ use of the strike weapon or employers’ resort to lockouts, 
turn on whether the Court believes that the Act should be interpreted to afford 
more or less protection to workers or to the employer in that circumstance, 
which in turn dictates the power balance between the parties in bargaining.77 
The law’s alternating receptivity and hostility to group action in NLRA 
jurisprudence thus provides a clear organizing theme for the course.78 
Viewed in isolation, the employment discrimination and employment law 
cases that focus on status-based discrimination theory or procedural 
requirements for class claims look quite distinct. When taught in discrete 
topical units, these cases present a confusing array of doctrines that students 
struggle to master. But when connected to the history of conflict over 
leveraging of group power in labor law, these disparate areas can be seen as 
part of a larger whole. Students comprehend the various doctrines more readily 
and are better equipped to pull arguments from one area into the others and to 
predict how the law will next evolve. So, we ask, is some form of group action 
essential in the employment context for workers to advance their interests? 
Does it make a difference which form the group action assumes—class action, 
collective action, class claim in arbitration, or formal unionism and collective 
bargaining? How should law advance, cabin, or frame these mechanisms to 
achieve justice in the workplace? 
CONCLUSION 
The two examples discussed here illustrate the difference it makes to adopt 
a more comprehensive frame in teaching the law of work rather than adhering 
to the traditional tripartite division into labor law, employment discrimination, 
and employment law. The first—examining how social media use interacts 
with the workplace—highlights the importance of recognizing legal issues 
without regard to doctrinal category. Such an approach is not only practically 
important, it also helps to deepen student understanding of the competing 
interests at stake and how they inter-relate. For example, employee interests in 
privacy appear in some tension with efforts to eliminate harassing behavior 
 
 76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 407–08 (1952) (cautioning the 
Board that it could not seek to alter the balance of power by shaping the substantive bargain 
struck by the parties; to do so would “disrupt collective bargaining,” which the board was not 
empowered to do); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (observing that 
fundamental premise of the Act is freedom of contract, with governmental supervision of 
procedure only). 
 77. ATLESON, supra note 71, at 19–34, 44–66. 
 78. See id. at 7 (arguing that labor law is coherent only when consideration is afforded to 
hidden values and assumptions manifested by legal doctrine). 
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that may affect the work environment. In other ways, however, privacy rights 
and anti-discrimination norms can be mutually reinforcing, as when employees 
seek to keep certain personal characteristics, such as genetic or other medical 
information, from becoming the basis for employment decisions.79 
The second example—the historical and continuing struggle by workers to 
leverage group power in dealing with the employer—further illustrates how a 
broader frame enriches student comprehension, offering a theme that ties the 
course together across time and topics. Looking across doctrinal boundaries 
reveals that individual and group conceptions of workers’ interests continually 
struggle for dominance, showing how developments in the law lead logically 
to a further response as the underlying struggle over power in the workplace 
continues. Emphasizing this theme connects seemingly unrelated 
developments, making convoluted doctrine more comprehensible and helping 
students to begin to predict how the law will evolve next. 
The holistic approach to teaching work law we outline here is a 
philosophy, not a set curriculum. Such an approach could inform the 
development of a stand-alone survey course in a school that only has the 
resources to offer one class on a work law topic. However, the approach is also 
amenable to use in traditional courses, ensuring that the materials relating to 
labor law, employment discrimination, or individual rights are not taught in a 
vacuum. A holistic view of the work relationship is particularly useful in the 
introductory Employment Law course, where, given the absence of a core 
federal statute to offer an organizing theme, the challenge of coherence is most 
pressing. Rather than presenting the field as a series of unrelated statutory and 
common law doctrines, a more comprehensive view offers organizing themes 
and allows students to develop a deeper understanding of the core tensions 
underlying all of the law of work. 
  
 
 79. See, Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–1 (2006) 
(prohibiting both discrimination on the basis of genetic characteristics and the privacy of 
employees’ genetic information); Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: 
Rethinking Employee Protection for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1501 
(2002). 
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